updated February, 8, 2025

BRICS+ is an increasingly powerful association made up of countries mainly from the Global South. Myanmar, in the midst of its situation of internal war, on the long run is standing in line for membership. What are its chances of acceptance? On the one hand, Myanmar has strong advocates in Russia, India, and China, on the other hand, there is the country’s political instability paired with the unresolved situation of the Rohingya.

Ivan Grozny reigned over Kazan as Ivan IV (1530-1584) going down into history as a cruel man. A popular proverb at those times went like: “Put a wish into Ivan’s basket”, meaning ‘You make a wish which shall never be granted’.

The BRICS+ summit 2024 took place in Kazan, Russian Federation, with Russia as the host country. The summit attracted worldwide attention.

In its core, the cooperation is a 1996-brainchild of former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov who designed a Russian-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle “to counterbalance the power of the United States” (Duggan et al.: 2021).

The acronym BRICS+ stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The + meaning all countries which joined subsequently. By historically perceiving the West as its unjust dominator, the BRiCS+ countries feel somehow united. Challenging the postwar world order of Bretton Woods (1944 ), the no longer impoverished BRICS+countries’ performance in Kazan provoked the New York Times to comment “We’ve just Had a Glimpse of the World to Come”.

Hopes for financial, social, and economic advantages, well-financed infrastructure projects, loans from the New Development Bank (NDP), the partnerships’ financial institute, and opulent trade and investment opportunites is what 30-40 other countries motivate to apply. Myanmar is one of the applicants, having been engaged in the process of application even before Thailand.

In 2023, the Burmese ambassador to Brazil started Myanmar’s efforts to join BRICS+. Whereas Thailand has achieved partnership status within one year, postcoup Myanmar has not. In September 2024 Myanmar aimed to get the observer status which is less than to apply for full membership.

Myanmar is widely perceived as a conflict-ridden state under worsening conditions. By no means is today’s Myanmar able to fulfill the BRICS+ standard of a “strong economic standing and influence regionally as well as globally”. Although many BRICS+ members are not flagship countries when it comes to those standards, conditions in Myanmar are especially complicated and painful.

A standard procedure for the process of applying has been laid down at the Johannesburg summit in 2023. BRICS+ is a consus-oriented construction. International relations are in the center’s partnership, bilateral relations are fundamentel for the multilateral architecture.

What are Myanmar’s relations to the ten current members? What are its chances to be accepted in BRICS+?

Brazil

It was the Myanmar Ambassador to Brazil who initiated contact in Brazil concerning Myanmar’s membership in BRICS+. The relations between the two countries are not extraordinaly developed, but in 2021 Human Right Watch had blamed Brazil for its “passivity in face of the coup”. Whereas Myanmar has two representations in Brazil, the Brazilian Embassy in Myanmar opened in October 2023 in Yangon. For boosting “bilateral cooperation”, there is also a Chargé d’Affaires in Nay Pyi Taw. In 2024, Brazil showed interest in supporting Myanmar to found a diplomatic school. During the opening period of Myanmar, in September 2017, a delegation of young Burmese diplomats had been invited to Berlin, managed by the former program director Myanmar of the German Foreign Office. Unexpectedly, it turned out to be an untimely project due to the Burmese army’s deeds in Rakhine State and then beginning of Myanmar’s downgrading image in the world. It remains to be seen how the still weak relations between Brazil and Myanmar will develop.

Russia The former Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with the Union of Burma in 1948. Now, the relationship between Russia and Myanmar is unprecedently close. Russia has replaced China as Myanmar‘s main arms-supplier (Storey: 2023), and the traditionally strong defense sector of cooperation is supplemented by growing touristic and commercial activities.   The energy sector concerning nuclear power, hydropower, and windfarm projects to be built in Myanmar is of utmost importance for both countries, even though neither side provides any details. For their belligerence, both countries are ostracized by the major part of the world. This condemnation is mainly expressed in the bodies of the United Nations. In the Security Council where Russia is a steady member, Myanmar is traditionally shielded against any actions of the council by Russian diplomats.   After the 2021 coup d’état “in sharp contrast to almost the rest of the world”, Russia quickly acknowledged the State Administration Council (SAC), expecting new opportunities for its own affairs. In 2023 “Myanmar has become the second most important country for Russia in Southeast Asia after Vietnam” (Storey: 3). On his part, the SAC “endorsed Russia’s attack on Ukraine on 24th February”, the day of the invasion.  Displaying Myanmar’s double governance situation, Myanmar voted in both respective UN-resolutions against the invasion. Whereas the SAC represents the military government in Myanmar, the country’s UN-ambassador was appointed by the National League of Democracy (NLD)-government in October 2020. This became Myanmar’s civilian parallel government as the National Unity Government (NUG). Under current circumstances Russia is making Myanmar a “key ally” and will hence vote for Myanmar’s membership in BRICS+. India   India and Myanmar are connected by a common land and maritime border of 1020 miles. They are tied by history and culture due to the Hindu and Buddhist heritage. By redefining the Look East Policy Prime Minister Narendra Modi started the Act East Policy in 2014. From the beginning, this policy was also designed to have a stable neighbor Myanmar. Currently, India is bolstering Myanmar with a Development Assistance of US $ 1,75 bn “mostly in form of grants”. India is involved in several projects in Myanmar like establishing the Kaladan Project or setting up the Rakhine State Development Program. After 2016, India gave money to the Ananda temple‘s restoration in Bagan.   The situation after the coup in Myanmar has hardened pre-existing problems on the Indian-Myanmar border. For many years, the border-crossing fightings have caused a lot of inquiety especially in the province of Manipur sharing a 500km-long border with Myanmar. Also the province of Mizoram is affected. In 2015, the Indian army intervened. Notwithstanding the Free Movement Agreement, India considers fencing the border to Myanmar to counter the steady influx of refugees and illegal migrants. Here it seeks the support of the SAC in Nay Pyi Taw.   While China, India, and Myanmar are all represented in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), India in the grand scheme wants to push back China in South Asia. In this strategy, Myanmar is considered a buffer state.   Concerning the situation inside Myanmar, India and China both play a peacemakers‘ role. Both countries are interested in a balanced situation. It can be taken for granted that India votes for Myanmar’s membership in BRICS+. China For a number of reasons, including historical, cultural and economic aspects, China and Myanmar are deeply connected. Due to the war-like unrest after 1949 in Northern Myanmar, the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Burma had a difficult start. In the 1950s, the diplomatic relations were turned into pauk phaw, a brotherly relationship, which has never been cancelled. In 2016, then State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi made her first trip outside ASEAN to Beijing, strengthening the relationship again.   China has very strong interests in Myanmar. Being one of the country‘s biggest foreign investors, its main motivation of engagement will always be the protection of its own investments. Simultaneously, China for strategic reasons is safeguarding its landbridge to the Bay of Bengal. For various reasons, China is an object of mistrust in Myanmar. Even though China wishes not to be perceived as an enemy, there is an increasing degree of hostility on the Burmese side against China. Due to historical entanglements China is connected to several Ethnic Armed Organisations operating on the Chinese-Myanmar border. Those multi-dimensioned relations enabled China to act as a peacebroker in 2024 as well as in January 2025. Currently, high level contacts between the SAC and the Chinese government are narrow-lipped. So far, Gen. Sen. Min Aung Hlaing has not been invited to Beijing. On the other hand, the visit of China’s Foreign Minister to Nay Pyi Taw shortly before the coup is well remembered in Myanmar.   Having substantial arguments at hand, China will support a BRICS+ membership of Myanmar.   South Africa   South Africa, emerging from an uncomparable history of apartheid, ethnic violence and deep injustice, nowadays plays a new role on the world stage. Outspokenly, it took Israel to the International Court of Justice in 2024.   After the 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar, the Foreign Office of South Africa officially backed the NLD by calling upon the military “to respect the rule of law”. The current diplomatic relations between South Africa and Myanmar are arid.   Whereas Myanmar has an embassy in Pretoria, South Africa “for the moment” has no embassy in Myanmar. There is an Embassy in Bangkok and there is a Consulate in Chiang Mai.   Relations inside BRICS+ play also a role in accepting new members. As an example serves the historically grown South African-Russian relationship, and for certain reasons, South Africa occasionally subordinates its own convictions to those of Russia. In 2007, South Africa voted, when nobody else did, together with China and Russia in favor of military-governed Myanmar in the UNSC. It was the former Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, who expressed his unwillingness about his country’s non-siding with the Burmese people (Bischoff: 2009). Today’s South Africa is upholding its democratic ideals. It is highly improbable that it will vote for Myanmar‘s membership in BRICS+ as long as Myanmar is under military rule.  To what extent Russia as the strongest partner of Myanmar will exercise its influence on South Africa concerning BRICS+ remains to be seen. Egypt Diplomatic relations were established by General Gamal Abdel Nasser and Prime Minister U Nu in 1953. Today, the Arab republic of Egypt as an Islamic country does not look as a friend at Myanmar. The excesses against the Rohingya in 2017 are burdening both countries‘ relationship.   On the other hand, Egypt’s current rulers came to power by a coup d’état. Like Myanmar, the country is under continuous surveillance of international Human Rights Organisations and the UN. Currently, Myanmar is strongly interested in improving its economic relationship with Egypt as reported in Burmese state media and on official Myanmar websites.  For the moment, Egypt’s decision for or against Myanmar in BRICS+ is not predictable. Ethiopia  Ethiopia and Myanmar established diplomatic relations in December 2015.   The nearest representation of Ethiopia to Myanmar are the embassies in Kalkota/India and Chongwin/China. Myanmar holds a non-resident embassy in Cairo, the Ethiopian Ambassador to Myanmar has residence in Tokyo.  As other BRICS+ members do within their own regional context, Ethiopia and Egypt bring in the conflict dynamics of the Red Sea. Dynamics like these will influence the association’s atmosphere as well as its capacity to act depending on the degree of internal divisions. In summer 2024, Ethiopia and Myanmar announced “to forge a beneficial cooperation”. So far, no projects have been defined, the relationship is still developing. Its direction is not predictable. Indonesia  Indonesia and Myanmar have been historically tied for centuries. Their diplomatic relationship was established in 1949. During the Cold War in Asia, Indonesia hosted the Bandung Conference (1955). This conference was a historic stand up of Asian-African nations against colonization and racism, hereby establishing “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. Bandung was the founding moment of the Non-Alignment-Movement. In 1997, Indonesia advocated Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN. Holding the ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, it preferred a highly diplomatic way in dealing with postcoup Myanmar. This happened still in the spirit of Bandung.   Indonesia as the nation with the biggest Islamic population worldwide has to deal with the Rohingya in a special way. Wishing to escape the camps of Bangladesh, the Rohingya flee, or try to flee, also to Indonesia. As a consequence, in December 2023, Indonesian students in Aceh/Indonesia rioted against the increasing number of refugees while demanding their deportation.  Another aspect of this migration is Indonesia’s internal security situation. In an unfortunate way, some activities categorized as those of “Islamic terrorists“ of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are connected with the Rohingya cause. In 2018, an activist in West-Sumatra promoted the JI‘s agenda by misusing the humanitarian situation of the Rohingya as a pretext for collecting some money (Rahmah, Gunasingham. 2023: 13).   Even though the Rohingyas‘ situation from Myanmar and Bangladesh is an unresolved issue on the Indonesian political agenda, it is highly probably that the country will vote for Myanmar as a member in BRICS+, itself being a full member since January 2025. Iran   Currently, neither Iran nor Myanmar maintain an embassy in each other’s country. Until 2022 diplomatic or any military ties between both countries were unknown. This changed, when in 2022 U.S.-blacklisted airplanes of the Iranian cargo line Qeshm Fars Air were spotted in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. As a consequence, an Iranian weapons sale to sanctioned Myanmar was suspected and later confirmed. In June 2024, Than Swe as Myanmar’s Foreign Minister visited Tehran in order to take part at the Asia Cooperation Dialogue which Myanmar is a member of.  While monitoring the human rights situation in Iran and Myanmar, the United Nations Human Rights Body had backed extended mandates for both countries in April 2024. Even though the Islamic Republic of Iran has been under theocratic-republican rule for decades, its government refrained from condemning the coup d‘état in Myanmar. So far, the regime in Tehran has neither protested against Myamar’s treatment of the Rohingya while greeting Myanmar as another “sanction-evasion channel“. In which directions the relation will develop is hard to predict. Currently, Iran and Myanmar are brothers in arms.   Under these conditions it is highly probably that Iran will vote for a Burmese BRICS+ membership.   United Arab Emirates (UAE)   UAE and Myanmar established diplomatic relations in 2015. The connection between both countries seems to be loosely. An exception is UAE’s strong condemnation of Myanmar in 2017 due to “the crimes against the Rohingya”. In 2018, UAE together with Saudi Arabia and Malaysia opened a “fully equipped field hospital” in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where the world’s biggest refugee camp is located. It remains to be seen in which directions the relationship between UAE and Myanmar will develop.

  

What are Myanmar’s chances of a BRICS+ membership?

Within a year, Myanmar has downgraded its level of interest concerning BRICS+ from announcing interest in full membership to that of receiving observer status in an association which is “in quest for a just multipolar world”. Russia, India, and China might be powerful advocates of Myanmar, but this is not enough. In applying for full membership, Myanmar will have to convince the Islamic BRICS+member countries critical of Myanmar’s handling of the Rohingyas‘ situation, too. Moreover, Malaysia already submitted an application for BRICS+ inside ASEAN being known for its sharp Myanmar policy. Concerning the 2021 coup d’état, South Africa is an outspoken opponent of the SAC. Simultaneously, South Africa is connected to Russia. This is an example of intra-institutional dynamics displaying a diplomatic dilemma situation. Regional conflict dynamics of the diverse members have also to be considered, and Myanmar would bring into BRICS+ more than one conflict. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been involved in arms deals with Myanmar considering the country an alternative trade partner while under sanctions. The BRICS+members Brazil and Ethiopia are weakly bonded with Myanmar. This notwithstanding, the SAC having noticed Brazil’s not too loud reaction to the coup turned just to Brazil for announcing its interest in BRICS+. In search of legitimization, Myanmar’s military rulers are eager to strengthen ties with every country possible, as many of its diplomatic activities prove. But Myanmar‘s pursuing of a BRICS+membership is burdened by the country’s internal conflicts and wars. A changed political situation and a new approach to the situation of the Rohingya would not only improve Myanmar’s chances of acceptance, but seem to be preconditions of a BRICS+membership. When Myanmar was accepted in ASEAN in 1997, integration and inclusion as stabilizing effects had been an argument. This time, it is different. Well aware of the fact that under current circumstances Myanmar has no chances to be unanimously accepted by all ten BRICS+members, the SAC’s Information Minister Maung Maung Ohn said in Moscow 2024: “In the future we would like to apply for full membership.” Did he put a wish in Ivan’s basket?

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